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Allocating Pooled Inventory According
to Contributions and Entitlements
Yigal Gerchak∗
Abstract. Inventory pooling, whether by centralization of stock or by mutual assistance, is
known to be beneficial when demands are uncertain. But when the retailers are independent,
the question is how to divide the benefits of pooling. e consider a decentralized inventory-
pooling scheme where a retailer’s entitlements to the allocation during a shortage depend
on his/her contributions to the pool. We derive the Nash equilibrium and specialize it to
symmetric cases.
Keywords: inventory pooling; retailer contributions; entitlements; Nash equilibrium
Mathematics Subject Classification: 90, 91
Revised: January 9, 2015
1. INTRODUCTION
Inventory pooling in a decentralized system raises the issue of how to divide benefits
among the parties, which is typically done using concepts from cooperative games
(e.g., Gerchak and Gupta 1991; Hartman et al., 2000; Müller et al., 2002; Montruc-
chio et al., 2012); In particular, if the before-pooling optimal expected profits are
pi∗1 (q
∗
1)and pi∗2 (q∗2), and the optimal expected profit after pooling is pi∗ (q∗), the gain,
pi∗ (q∗)−pi∗1 (q∗1)−pi∗2 (q∗2) could be divided proportionally to pi∗1 (q∗1) and pi∗2 (q∗2). That
allocation can be shown to belong to the (non-empty) core. We propose a very different
“operational” non-cooperative scheme according to which the parties have entitlements
that are increasing functions of their contributions to the pool rather than a typical
division of benefits. The idea was proposed by Ben-Zvi and Gerchak (2012, sec. 11.5);
but here, we analyze the consequences of a somewhat-modified scheme. The scheme
can be shown to be beneficial to all parties vis-á-vis a no-pooling situation, namely is
in core.
The scheme works as follows: each party (e.g., retailer) contributes a quantity of
its choice to the pool. There is no inventory at the retailers’ locales. The choice of
these quantities is simultaneous. If the quantity of pooled inventory is not sufficient to
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meet all realized demands, a retailer whose contribution exceeds its demand receives
an allocation equal to its demand. The other retailer (whose demand exceeds its
contribution) receives the rest of the inventory. If both demands exceed the respective
contributions, each retailer receives its contribution. The scheme can be shown to be
beneficial for all parties vis-ŕ-vis a no-pooling scenario. Mathematically (but not in
type of motivations), our model is related to Shao et al. (2011).
The simultaneous selection of quantities to contribute to the pool is a non-
cooperative game. In a symmetric scenario (unit cost, revenue, demand distributions),
we solve directly for the (common) order quantity. We provide an example.
2. GENERAL MODEL
Let ri be the unit revenue and ci unit production cost of party i, ri > ci∀i. The
distributions of the independent demands, X1 and X2, are F1 and F2. The parties are
simultaneously looking for their best contribution quantities q1 and q2. The actual
allocations to the parties as a function of demand realizations (x1, x2)are denoted by
a1 and a2.
The policy (contract) is as follows.
If xi ≤ qi, then ai = xi;
if, in addition, xj ≤ qj then aj = xj ;
if xj > qj and xi + xj ≤ qi + qj , then aj = xj ;
if xj > qj and xi + xj > qi + qj , then aj = qi + qj − xi (≤ xj). [This is the
case where inventory pooling helps party j].
If xi > qi and xj > qj , then ai = qi and aj = qj . ‖
So party i′s expected profit is:
Ei = −ciqi + ri
{ qi∫
xi=0
xi
qj∫
xj=0
fi (xi) fj (xj) dxjdxi
+
qi+qj∫
xi=qi
qi+qj−xi∫
xj=0
xifi (xi) fj (xj) dxjdxi
+
qi+qj∫
xi=qi
qj∫
xj=qi+qj−xi
(qi + qj − xj) fj (xj) fi (xi) dxjdxi
+
∞∫
xi=qi+qj
qj∫
xj=0
(qi + qj − xj) fj (xj) fi (xi) dxjdxi
+
∞∫
xi=qi
∞∫
xj=qj
qifi (xi) fj (xj) dxjdxi
}
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so:
dEi/dqi = −ci + ri
{
2F j (qj)F i (qi)− qifi (qi)F j (qj)
+ qjFj (qj)− qifj (qj)Fi (qi + qj)
+
qi+qj∫
xi=qj
Fj (qi + qj − xi) dxi + Fj (qj)F i (qi + qj)− qifj (qj)
}
Note that Ei is an explicit function of only ci and ri. On the other hand, it depends
on both Fi and Fj .
In the symmetric case (c1 = c2 ≡ c, r1 = r2 ≡ r), F1 = F2 ≡ F , where we will
look for a symmetric equilibrium, q1 = q2 ≡ q, we have (r > c)
dE/dq = −c+ r
{
2
[
F (q)
]2 − qf(q)F (q) + qF (q)− qf(q)F (2q)
+ F (q)F (2q)− qf(q) +
2q∫
q
F (2q − x)dx
}
dE/dq|q=0 = −c+ 2r > 0⇒ q∗ > 0
3. UNIFORMLY DISTRIBUTED DEMANDS
Here X ∼ U [0, 1], so 0 ≤ q ≤ 1.
If q ≤ 12 , the optimality condition becomes:
−c+ r (−3q2 − 3q + 2) = 0
i.e., 3q2 + 6q − 4 + 2cr = 0.
So:
q∗ = 1−
√
21− 6cr
3
(
<
1
2
)
.
If q > 12 , the optimality condition becomes:
−c+ r
(
9
2
q2 − 7q + 2
)
= 0
i.e., q2 − 14q + 4− 2cr = 0
⇒ q∗∗ = 7−
√
45 +
2c
r
However, q∗∗ < 12 . Thus, the solution in this range is either boundary q =
1
2 or q = 1.
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4. CONCLUDING REMARKS
In partnerships, the partners’ entitlements to profits are often based on their ownership
shares. We use a similar philosophy in allocating scarce inventories. That translates to
a non-cooperative game.
Issues that were not explored in this context but might be of interest include:
1) Non-Linear productions costs (Gerchak and Schwarz, 2014).
2) Holding some inventory at the retailers’ locales ("partial pooling"), possibly with
transshipment costs from the pool.
3) More insight into the case of non-symmetric parameters.
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